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Introduction. 
The 1999 European Assembly elections were fought under newly devised rules.  The adoption 
of a more proportional electoral procedure in place of the traditional single member majoritarian 
system was designed to bring the UK into line with the other EU member states.  This departure 
from 'first past the post' necessitated a change in the way prospective Members of the European 
Parliament were selected.  In the event this proved controversial.  Of further contention was the 
decision to adopt a closed list system whereby electors were not able to vote for a preferred 
candidate.  Prospective MEPs were thus numerically ranked in multiple member constituencies. 
 
The selection of European parliamentary candidates attracted considerable media interest.  
Various newspapers covered, with relish, the purging of Europhiles from the already minimal 
compliment of Conservative MEPs.  Aside from Tom Spencer, who resigned for personal 
reasons following revelations about his personal life, others such as Brendan Donnelly and John 
Stevens declined to serve as candidates following their effective demotion by the party's 
selection procedure.  Donnelly and Stevens took their grievance further and formed a new 
organisation, the Pro Euro Conservatives, in order to (unsuccessfully) contest the forthcoming 
elections.  Another Europhile, London MEP James Moorhouse, left the party for the Liberal 
Democrats in protest at William Hague's policy pronouncements.  By contrast the new crop of 
prospective MEPs appeared to reflect the strong strain of Euroscepticism within the 
Conservative grassroots.  The Hague leadership welcomed membership involvement in this 
matter.  By contrast the Labour hierarchy proved more circumspect about its candidate selection 
procedure.  This paper seeks to assess whether there is substance to the charge that the new 
system has in effect enabled officials from the Millbank headquarters to dictate who would and 
would not become MEPs.   
 
 The Origins of 'Panelism'. 
The rise of the Labour left in the 1970s and early 1980s culminated in a number of important 
organisational changes designed to give more influence to activists within the party grassroots.  
The commitment to internal reform, promoted by groups like the Campaign for Labour Party 
Democracy, centred on a number of issues to do with policy formation and candidate selection.  
On assuming the leadership in 1983 Neil Kinnock, an erstwhile standard bearer of the left, 
began to break with his former comrades.  One critical way in which he did so was to press for a 
system of One Member One Vote whereby everybody belonging to the party would have a say 
in candidate selection.  This direct form of democracy would have challenged Labour's newly 
enhanced representative structures and, in so doing, the increasing influence of left activists 
within the organisation. 
 
Kinnock did not succeed at his first attempt to introduce pure OMOV in 1984.  Following the 
1987 election defeat significant reforms did take place whereby members obtained the right to 
play some role in leadership and candidate selection ballots.  Most importantly the leadership, 
through an increasingly compliant National Executive Committee, began to exert increased 
control over the symbolically important business of by-election candidate selection.1  In a series 
of controversial cases the centre demonstrated its determination to impose its will on regional 
and local parties.  It did so by the use of a special NEC taskforce, or panel, charged with co-
ordinating selection procedures.  In many cases the process was straightforward but in several it 
was not.  The workings of the NEC by-election taskforce are important because they offer an 
insight into the origins of 'panelism', a system whereby de facto control of candidate selection 
passes from the ordinary voluntary membership to the party professionals. 
 
By-elections offer a peculiar challenge to parties and single results can and do have serious 
political consequences.  The shock Liberal victory at Orpington in 1962 undermined confidence 
in the then Conservative premier Harold Macmillan and helped precipitate his resignation.  
                                                 
1 Shaw, E. (1994) The Labour Party since 1979.  London: Routledge, pp.114-17. 
Similarly the party's poor third place in the Bradford North contest of 1990 reinforced Margaret 
Thatcher's precarious position and she was forced out soon after.  The infamous Bermondsey 
campaign of 1983, in which Labour lost a safe seat to the Liberals, damaged the then Labour 
leader Michael Foot's standing.  By-elections can, however, also enhance politicians' repuations.  
Labour's victory in Darlington over the newly founded SDP in the year running up to the 1983 
general election did much to secure Foot's position as leader.  More often though it is the 
defeats that are remembered.  Months before the 1987 general election, Foot's successor 
Kinnock faced a crucial test in the Greenwich by-election.  Labour candidate Deirdre Wood was 
subjected to a ferocious media campaign which ultimately contributed to her SDP rival's 
victory.  The loss of this previously safe seat demoralised party morale at a critical moment.2 
 
The events of Greenwich and subsequent internal inquest encouraged the NEC to take a greater 
role in the candidate selection process.  The move for this kind of reform was augmented by 
another embarassing by-election defeat, this time after the general election.  Glasgow Govan 
had been the safe Labour seat of former minister Bruce Millan.  Millan's decision to become a 
European Commissioner forced a by-election.  Once again media scrutiny undermined Labour 
candidate Bob Gillespie and helped his combative SNP rival Jim Sillars to take the seat on a 
huge swing.  Some in the leadership, weary of Gillespie's left politics, once again questioned 
whether party members were the best equipped people to choose candidates for these potentially 
high profile campaigns.  Ironically comparatively less was made about the local unpopularity of 
the decison, taken by Millan in consultation with Kinnock, which had caused the by-election.   
 
Following Greenwich and Govan, every subsequent Labour by-election candidate was subject 
to scrutiny from the central party.  This was done through the institution of a special NEC 
vetting panel.  When the Pontypridd seat fell vacant in 1989, there was speculation whether the 
local party's chosen standbearer, Kim Howells, would be endorsed and allowed to stand.  
Howells, a personal friend of Kinnock, did in fact go on to fight and win the seat before 
becoming a member of the Blair government.  Other prospective MPs were not so fortunate.  
                                                 
2 Heffernan, R. and Marqusee, M.(1992) Defeat from the Jaws of Victory.  London: Verso, pp.72-74. 
When the Yorkshire coalfield seat of Hemsworth came vacant in 1991 several groups within the 
Constituency Labour Party nominated Ken Capstick, a prominent member of the National 
Union of Mineworkers, as their choice for candidate.  In spite of his local popularity Capstick 
was blocked by a central apparatus weary left-wing policy positions.  When former Leeds MEP 
Derek Enright was chosen the decision caused an outcry within the local party.  The Labour 
leadership nevertheless felt vindicated when they retook the seat albeit on a lower turnout and 
diminished majority.   
 
The end of the Kinnock leadership did not precipitate a change in the centre's hold over by-
election campaigns.  Following the introduction of pure One Member One Vote in 1993 the 
NEC panel continued to vet all nominees for vacant seats.  In doing so it continued to play a 
critical role in the process.  Prior to the Rotherham by-election of 1994 the panel excluded 
popular local activist Pete Thirlwell despite his several nominations from within the 
constituency.  Thirlwell, it was claimed, lacked sufficient media skills.  This was not a 
accusation levelled at successful candidate Denis MacShane, a past President of the National 
Union of Journalists.  Leadership favoured MacShane had been a contender for the seat's 
nomination prior the general election and was thus well known locally.  In a shortlist with 
several less fancied rivals he won a ballot of the membership and then the by-election itself.   
 
The ability of the NEC panel to exclude locally popular and amply supported nominees has 
proved crucial in other by-election selections.  In 1994 Jon Cryer's attempt to succeed his late 
father and fellow left-winger Bob as Bradford South's MP was curtailed by the national party.  
The panel shortlisted four nominees but Cryer was not included despite his several nominations.  
Only one of these, council leader Gerry Sutcliffe, was well known locally.  Sutcliffe won the 
subsequent ballot with ease.  Similarly when the spotlight once again fell on Hemsworth 
following Derek Enright's sudden death, the central party refused to allow another locally 
popular and NUM backed candidate, Steve Kemp, onto the shortlist for the by-election.3  The 
eventual victor in the selection, Leeds City Council leader Jon Trickett, was a local politician 
                                                 
3  The Guardian 5th December 1995. 
well known to national officials.  The decision underlined how 'panelism' would continue to 
play a role under the new leadership of Tony Blair. 
From 'New Model' to 'New' Labour. 
Talk of 'control freakery' has increased during the leadership of Tony Blair.  Blair himself 
played a significant role in the symbolically important first by-election that followed Labour's 
landslide victory and return to office in 1997.  Uxbridge had returned the sitting MP Michael 
Shersby by a small majority.  Following Shersby's sudden death hours after polling, Labour had 
the chance to take another seat at the very height of its popularity.  Supporters of the NEC panel 
had claimed it worked because it produced popular candidates capable of winning.  The 
experience of Uxbridge challenged this view when, following considerable local opposition, 
Labour's general election candidate David Williams was excluded from a two person shortlist.  
Barely weeks after he had nearly been elected, Williams was now deemed not sufficiently 
credible to contest the seat by his own party leadership.  Breaking with tradition, Blair visited 
the constituency to personally endorse and boost the campaign of new (or perhaps 'New') 
Labour candidate Andrew Slaughter.  The appropriately named Slaughter, a councillor from 
outside of the borough, was defeated with the locally based Conservative actually increasing the 
party's majority. 
 
The practice of 'panelism' is not then a purely New Labour phenomenon but a legacy of the 
Kinnock and Smith leaderships.  Crucially though this mechanism for exercising control is 
being expanded and used to police various selection procedures.  In the run up to the 1999 
elections for the new Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly the party convened special 
panels to oversee and monitor the process by which candidate would be chosen.  The system 
produced several high profile casualties, most notably in Scotland.  One Westminster MP, Denis 
Canavan, was expelled from the party when he opted to fight his own seat having failed to win 
the nomination.  His comfortable election to the Scottish parliament appeared to vindicate his 
stance against 'control freakery' and succeeded in highlighting the wider popular support that 
existed for his position.   
 
The constitutional reform process has also produced a new tier of regional government for the 
capital city.  In 2000 Londoners are due to vote for a new assembly and will also have the 
chance to choose the country's first directly elected mayor.  Labour MP and leading left-winger 
Ken Livingstone has already expressed an interest in standing.  Livingstone was previously 
leader of the last capital wide strategic authority, the Greater London Council.  A key centre of 
opposition to the then Thatcher government, the GLC was abolished in the mid-1980s.  Despite 
his campaigning abilities and media skill, Livingstone's opposition to government economic 
policies has raised speculation that Blair and the central party will prevent him becoming 
Labour's mayoral candidate.  This will almost certainly be done through an NEC panel 
empowered to exclude nominees from a decisive ballot of the sizeable city wide membership.4 
 
Understandably the setting up of new tiers of Scottish, Welsh and London government has 
attracted a degree of media interest and speculation.  But perhaps the most revealing series of 
elections in terms of Labour party candidate selections were those that took place before the 
1999 European Assembly poll.  Here the practice of panelism was not being extended to a new 
set of candidatures in one particular geographical region of the country but involved the whole 
of the party nationwide.  Furthermore the selections involved an existing group of 
parliamentarians, many of which had expressed a desire to continue for a further term.  Elected 
at various times in the previous twenty years, the members of the European Parliamentary 
Labour Party (EPLP) included people of various persuasions and factional backgrounds.  Given 
the introduction of a new electoral system almost certainly meant a decrease in the overall 
number of Labour MEPs, the process for choosing candidates was destined to a particularly 
sensitive task. 
 
 
The Party into Europe. 
As successive name changes suggest, EEC/EC/EU member states envisaged a more politically 
integrated partnership.  The Thatcher and Major governments were critical of this position and 
those behind it.  Foremost amongst the politicians in the drive for greater integration was 
                                                 
4 .  Similar acrimony has surrounded the selection of some Welsh assembly candidates and has 
continually dogged the run-off between Welsh Secretary Alun Michael and his rival Rhodri Morgan 
for the nomination to be First minister in the new Assembly or 'prime minister of Wales'.  For details of 
this and other controversies see, for instance, The Guardian 10th November 1998. 
President of the European Commission Jacques Delors.  In manner and background social 
democrat Delors appealed to the leaders of the Labour party and Trades Union Congress in 
Britain.  Both put considerable resources and time into cultivating links with like-minded 
organisations within the EC/EU.  Indeed when Labour almost quadrupled its number of MEPs 
in the four successive Assembly elections held between 1979 and 1994.   This greatly increased 
its political influence with the party becoming the largest single group within the parliament.  
Unsurprisingly the EPLP became a useful resource in the party's overall strategy of opposition 
during the 1980s and early 1990s.  The stature of the group was underlined when, following the 
successful 1994 elections, London MEP Pauline Green became leader of the Party of European 
Socialists. 
 
The new electoral system, the so-called 'closed list' formula, introduced for the 1999 European 
Assembly campaign attracted considerable opposition from across the political spectrum.  
Supporters and opponents of electoral reform united in condemning the rule revision.  The 
legislation was attacked in parliament and at one stage it looked possible it might not proceed 
through the House of Lords were it was mercilessly dissected by Conservative spokespeople.  
Many believed the principle of voting for a regional party list conflicted with the British 
tradition of electors being able support a single named candidate.  Others expressed disquiet 
about the potential divisiveness of the proposed system.  The use of rankings, it was argued, 
would further a party leadership's influence over the process of candidate selection.5 
 
There were four principle stages in the selection of Labour candidates for the European 
Assembly.  In the initial phase all sitting MEPs were consulted as to whether they wished their 
names to go forward.  Each of the soon to be dissolved European constituency parties were 
invited to endorse their sitting MEP and nominate and then vote for one man and one woman to 
go forward to the final selection.  The next stage consisted of an OMOV ballot to determine 
                                                 
5  The new system meant Labour needed to select candidate lists for 11 of the 12 UK regions (the 
exception being Northern Ireland).  These are (with the number of seats in brackets):  Scotland (8); 
North (4); North West (10); Yorkshire and Humberside (7); Wales (5); West Midlands (8); East 
Midlands (6); Eastern (8); South West (7) Greater London (10); South East (11). 
who amongst those shortlisted should go forward.  Given more names went forward than list 
places existed, it was perhaps inevitable that there would be some disappointment.   
 
The last two phases of the process proved to be the most contentious.  For the third stage 
candidates had to complete a questionnaire detailing their experiences and motivations.  
Assistant General Secretary David Gardner and another regional official graded the reportedly 
'nameless' papers.  The records and performances of sitting MEPs were also evaluated.  The 
final element in the convoluted selection procedure involved the convening of NEC endorsed 
panels of national and regional officials and representatives.  Candidates were interviewed, 
invited to make a presentation and also cross-examined in a mock press conference to ascertain 
their political outlook and media aptitude.   
 
The selection procedure produced a set of marks for each candidate.  These were collated and a 
'consensus' meeting of officials and representatives convened to determine the rankings.  The 
committee had a wide and influential remit given it was reportedly able to protect existing 
'talent', foster the interests of women and minority nominees, and also 'shoehorn' candidates 
onto other regional lists.6  If those involved were in need of any further reminder, an 
independent academic report for the European public affairs consultancy Adamson Associates 
reinforced the importance of candidate order in the new list system.   
 
The report estimated each party's projected number of MEPs based on several different 
projections of their vote share.  Weary that the favourable opinion poll ratings might not be 
reflected at the polls, Labour officials took a cautious view of the Adamson projections and 
suggested the party's European representation might be cut to 34.7  Such a gloomy prognosis 
may have influenced the selection committee.  At the very least it would have underlined the 
fact that the particular order of ranking would be crucial in determining who got elected and 
who did not.  A place at the top or bottom of the list in this campaign pre-determined a Labour 
                                                 
6  'Labour HQ denies polls "stitch-up" ', The Guardian 19th November. 
7  The Independent, 18th November 1998. 
candidate's fate.  A move up or down of just one place in the various intermediate positions 
could, however, make all the difference. 
 
 
The Outcome in 1999. 
Approximately two thirds of the 62 Labour MEPs returned in 1994 contested the 1999 
Assembly elections.  22 of these 41 nominees were returned as MEPs.  43 other candidates 
filled the remaining places on the final party lists; only seven of them were successful.  Labour 
under Blair had experienced its first major electoral setback.  Having almost doubled the size of 
their parliamentary group, the Conservatives celebrated victory and claimed vindication for 
their determined anti-Single Currency campaign stance.  The Liberal Democrats also expressed 
satisfaction at having greatly increased their representation.  The Scottish Nationalists 
consolidated their position and were now joined in the Assembly by their Welsh allies Plaid 
Cymru.  The Greens and UK Independence parties also took their first ever seats in the 
Assembly.   
 
Some commentators, particularly those close to the leadership, blamed Labour's poor 
performance on the low voter turnout.  Others, such as former MEP Shaun Spiers, argued the 
party had not effectively campaigned nor developed a coherent message to counter the populist 
Eurosceptic rhetoric of the Conservatives.8  There was also a widespread belief that neither the 
party campaigns nor voters best responded to the new, more complex and proportional electoral 
system.  Some in the grassroots' structure complained that the workings of the list system 
disempowered and thusn demotivated the local memberships.  Consequently they failed to 
provide an adequate pool from which voluntary campaign labour could be drawn.9  Ironically 
the results provided the leadership with some compensation.  Had the election been fought 
under the old system, the same vote share would have probably further reduced the already 
limited number of Labour MEPs.   
                                                 
8  Tribune 2nd July 1999. 
9  For instance the parting shot of former candidate Joyce Edmond Smith who withdrew from the 
selection process, complaining panels in 1999 were no decent replacement for the OMOV system that 
had been adopted for the 1994 round. 
Analysing the Selection Procedure. 
In assessing the outcome of the parliamentary selection process several pertinent questions 
arise.  Did race or gender play a factor in the ranking of candidates?  The party reportedly 
wanted to increase its number of ethnic minority and women MEPs.  Did this commitment 
register in the outcome of the selection and then the election proper?  Did age, background 
and/or parliamentary experience make any perceptible difference?  Were younger people 
encouraged through the process?  Did people with manual working-class backgrounds still 
prosper?  And were the more experienced parliamentarians being effectively retired? 
 
Arguably the most interesting question relates to whether MEPs were ranked according to their 
ideological viewpoint.  It is notoriously difficult to determine this quality, even in a historically 
fractious party like Labour.  The emergence of 'New' Labour presents a further problem.  
However on the defining issue of Clause Four reform the EPLP publicly split over a crucial 
intervention midway through the debate.  The initiative took the form of an advert sponsored by 
Alex Falconer and countersigned by 31 of his fellow MEPs.  The piece, a call for the 
reaffirmation of Clause Four as it stood, first appeared in an edition of the weekly left 
newspaper Tribune and attracted little comment at the time.   
 
In early January Falconer re-advertised the text in The Guardian to coincide with a visit by 
Tony Blair to Brussels.  On the day it appeared the same newspaper made the item front page 
news.10  The move was interpreted as an act of defiance.  The leadership reacted by briefing 
sympathetic journalists about how, in a meeting with the whole EPLP, Blair denounced the 
'infantile incompetence' of those signatories to the letter.  Blair reportedly rejected a call for the 
renationalisation of key utilities from 'friend' and MEP David Hallam by telling him to 'grow 
up'. 11  The leader's petulant tone contrasted with his stated commitment to an open debate over 
the party's constitutional settlement.  Indeed Blair was quoted as saying he would now use the 
                                                 
10  The Guardian 10th January 1995. 
11  'Angry Blair slaps down rebel MEPs', The Guardian 12th January 1995. 
incident to censor colleagues' public utterances:  'Every member of the frontbench must check 
their policy statements and adhere to our policy making process'.12 
 
The flurry of publicity surrounding the advert was enough to make three signatories almost 
immediately recant their previous support for the Falconer statement.  They were eventual 
joined by four other colleagues.13  The seven, together with 29 of the other 30 MEPs (including 
all of the senior EPLP officers), endorsed a letter of reply co-ordinated by group leader Wayne 
David to The Guardian.  The David text was sympathetic to the leadership:  '(W)e welcome 
Tony Blair's initiative in inviting the Labour Party to debate how best to serve the interests of 
the British people into the next century'.14  The initiative attracted considerable and sympathetic 
coverage in the same paper's news reportage.  MEPs had, by their actions, given an important 
indication of their support for the 'old' Clause Four (or something similar) or a 'new', Blair 
sponsored version (as yet to be determined, but there were indications that the wording would 
underline the party's acceptance of market economics). 
 
 
Results of the Selections. 
If those MEPs who signed the Falconer statement are taken to be the supporters of ‘old’ Labour 
Clause Four, those who endorsed the rival David letter can be termed the ‘new’ group.  In this 
way it will be possible to assess how both tendencies fared in terms of the rank position each 
‘extant’ MEP obtained on their respective regional list.  This variable was further dichotomised 
into positions ‘3 and above’ and ‘4 and below’.  Being ranked at 3 on a Labour party list did not 
guarantee a candidate would be elected because the regions differed in the numbers of Members 
they returned.  Furthermore the different multi-member constituencies varied in their partisan 
allegiance.  Consequently a ranking in one region did not automatically transfer to another in 
terms of marginality.  However positions 3 and 4 appear suitable cut off points because they do 
                                                 
12  The Guardian 12th January 1995. 
13  These were Alan Donnelly (soon to be the new Group leader), David Bowe and Hugh McMahon, 
The Guardian, 11th January 1995.   
14  The Guardian 12th January 1995. 
suggest something about the likely electoral chances of a given candidate:  those ranked in the 
higher bracket were much more likely (and did, in a majority of regions) become MEPs.    
 
All those elected in 1994 were included in the study as were the two MEPs returned in by-
elections during the parliamentary session.  The five candidates elected in 1999 for the first time 
were added to make a total sample of 69.  20 of these did not, for various reasons, contest the 
elections as Labour candidates because they had retired or fallen out with the party.  In Tables 1 
to 4 these ex-MEPs are listed as ‘not standing’. 
 
Table 1 suggests Labour is making some progress in its bid to increase its compliment of 
women MEPs.  Men still, however, outnumber the women in our dataset by a ratio of 
approximately 2:1.  Crucially though 80% of the female candidates of the those in the sample 
who stood were ranked ‘3 or above’ in their list as opposed to only 59% of the male contingent.  
The small number of 3 Asian or Black politicians in the sample make it difficult to make any 
conclusive judgement about ethnic minority representation except to say, with two MEPs, it had 
in effect doubled.15   
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Tables 2 and 3 suggest their has been a ‘cull’ of older Labour MEPs.  16 of those standing down 
in 1999 were aged 60 or above.  13 of those retiring were also amongst the most experienced 
MEPs given they were first elected in either 1979 or 1984.  Conversely 21 (or 43%) of the 49 
candidates who contested the campaign in one of the coveted ‘3 and above’ slots were aged 30-
49.16  Similarly 26 (or 53%) were more recent entrants to the parliament, having been elected in 
1989 or 1994. 
 
                                                 
15  Asian candidates Neena Gill (West Midlands) and Claude Moraes (London) were elected though 
the only Black MEP, Mark Hendrick (North West), was not due to a low ranking.  
16  Youth was not necessarily a guarantor of reselection in a winnable ranking.  One of the youngest 
MEPs, Shaun Spiers, was placed low down on the London list despite his articulate and informed 
contributions to the Single Currency debate.  An opponent of the scheme, Spiers had also been a 
signatory to the Falconer advert. 
TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
In Table 4 it is possible to see how, amongst those not standing in 1999, there is a 
disproportionately high number of ‘old’ Clause Four supporters.i  The decline of this ‘wing’ of 
the party can also be detected in these candidates’ aggregate rankings in the regional lists.  Only 
36% of those ‘old’ Labour MEPs standing obtained a placing of ‘3 or above’.  By contrast some 
67% of those identified as ‘new’ in outlook received the same ranking in their respective 
regional lists.ii  The figures tend to suggest that ‘panelism’ may have worked to provide the 
Blair leadership with a more compliant and modernising group of MEPs.iii  That said none of 
the cross-tabulations were statistically significant.  At .080 the ideological ‘new’ versus ‘old’ 
Labour variable came closest.17 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 5 shows the results of running a logistic regression analysis.  This was done to allow an 
estimation of the probability that being in the ‘new’ Labour category would greatly enhance a 
candidate’s chance of being selected in the ‘3 or above’ section of a list.  Moreover logistic 
regression technique was chosen because the dependent variable, ‘position on list’, was 
dichotomous.18  The Table suggests that there is a greater probability of ‘ideological position’ 
rather than age, race, gender or cohort (year MEP entered parliament) being the factor that most 
determines whether a candidate is placed in the category ‘3 or above’.  The NEWLAB variable 
is the only significant one at the .05 level (.0236). 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
                                                 
17  This is unfortunately a perennial problem with the study of parliamentary parties where the N is 
naturally a small one. 
18  Norusis, J.M.(1994) SPSS Advanced Statistics.  Chicago. 
Conclusion:  Liquidating the Left? 
The elections for the new, devolved Scottish parliament and Welsh Assembly have 
understandably attracted considerable media coverage.  The procedures Labour used to select its 
candidates for both bodies were selected attracted particular controversy and speculation.  
Similarly the European elections, held a month later, offer an opportunity for a reappraisal and 
assessment of the extent to which the party leadership has been able to influence the process of 
candidate selection.  Significantly this process covered the whole of the party nationally and as 
such may provide something of an insight into how Millbank may try and influence the 
forthcoming round of selections for prospective Westminister MPs.  Central to the leadership’s 
acquisition of power in this important sphere of party activity has been the practice of 
‘panelism’ in which agents of the NEC have been willing and able to act in a partial manner 
against those parliamentary hopefuls deemed unsuitable on the grounds of their politics.   
 
Honed in the long period of opposition first under Kinnock and then Smith, panelism developed 
as means for managing local parties’ choice of by-election candidate.  This same procedure 
drove the selections for the European Assembly.  OMOV had been used for the first time in the 
1994 round in place of electoral colleges and General Management Committee votes.  The use 
of committees in 1999, this time convened by the party nationally, made the switch from 
OMOV all the more startling.  The results of the process have, similarly, been stark.  For the 
first time no members of the left-wing Campaign Group will sit as MEPs- six sat in the last 
parliament.  Other dissident voices such as Ken Coates are now gone.  A mere three out of the 
27 MEPs who unapologetically signed the Falconer pro ‘old’ Clause Four remain.  Of these the 
senior figure is Richard Balfe, not normally identified as a leading rebel.  In these circumstances 
it is speculating whether there will be any internal opposition from a parliamentary grouping 
who will be conscious that they, in part, own their selection to the leadership. 
 
 
Table 1. Gender and Ethnic Origin with ‘position on list’. 
 
Position   Sex    Ethnicity 
on list  male  female  minority  white 
 
1 to 3  20 (59%) 12 (80%)    2 (67%) 30 (65%) 
4 and below 14 (41%)   3 (20%)    1 (33%) 16 (35%) 
 
Total  34 (69%) 15 (31%)    3 (6%) 46 (94%) 
 
not standing 18    2     0  20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Age of Candidate with ‘position on list’. 
 
Position on 
list 
  AGE   
      
 21-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
      
1 to 3 1 (100%) 8 (89%) 13 (68%)   6 (50%) 4 (50%) 
4 and below 0 1 (11%)   6 (32%)   6 (50%) 4 (50%) 
Total 1 (2%) 9 (18%) 19 (39%) 12 (25%) 8 (16%) 
      
not standing 0 0   4   6 7 & 3 at 70+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Cohort with ‘position on list’. 
 
Position 
on  
      list 
  First 
became 
      MEP 
   
       
 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 by 
election 
pre-1999 
       
1 to 3 0   2 (40%) 10 (83%) 13 (59%) 5 (100%) 2 (100%) 
4 and 
below 
3 (100%)   3 (60%)   2 (17%)   9 (41%) 0 0 
Total 3 (6%)   5 (10%) 12 (25%) 22 (45%) 5 (10%) 2 (4%) 
       
not 3 10   6   1 0 0 
standing 
 
 
 
Table 4. ‘Ideology’ with ‘Position on list’. 
 
Position on 
list 
  Ideology   
      
 OLD NEW Both Old 
and  
     New 
Neither Old 
or  
     New 
Not MEP at  
     time 
      
1 to 3   4 (36%) 16 (67%) 4 (67%) 1 (100%) 7 (100%) 
4 and below   7 (64%)   8 (33%) 2 (33%) 0  0  
Total 11 (23%) 24 (49%) 6 (12%) 1 (2%) 7 (14%) 
      
not standing 14   5 1 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Logistic Regression of ‘Position on List’ with Gender, Race, Age, Cohort 
and ‘Newlab’. 
 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig 
      
GENDER    .8549   .8462 1.0206 1 .3124 
RACE -2.6818 2.2449 1.4271 1 .2322 
AGE    .3761   .4208   .7989 1 .3714 
COHORT   -.4818   .4497 1.1475 1 .2841 
NEWLAB -1.0700   .5008 4.5656 1 .0326 
Constant  3.8375 4.0713   .8885 1 .3459 
 
 
 
-2 Log Likelihood   48.155 
Goodness of fit    42.617 
  
                                                 
i Nearly a quarter of the EPLP elected in 1994 did not go forward to the final shortlisting committee.  Of these Ken 
Stewart had died during the parliamentary term.  Towards the end of the parliamentary term Norman West had had 
to resign on health grounds.  Two others, Ken Coates and Hugh Kerr, were expelled by the party’s General 
Secretary following a series of arguments about procedure and policy.  In a 1995 interview with the New Times 
paper Coates had been quoted as saying the 'unspeakable' Blair and his self styled modernising colleagues were 
'bastards' who would 'walk past' the unemployed (The Guardian 14th January 1995).  Similarly Kerr had incurred 
the wrath of the leadership for his outspoken opposition to some of their initiatives.  Both expressed their 
bemusement following the party's announcement of their expulsion.  Disillusionment turned to anger and the pair 
publicly condemned the direction their former party was taking:  'New Labour is New Autocracy and is the first 
step in the onward march of Blair's clones' (The Guardian 8th October 1998). 
 
Along with seven other MEPs who retired at the election, Coates, Kerr, Stewart and West had all supported the 
Falconer ‘old’ Clause Four statement.  By contrast the other four stepping down had backed the alternative David 
text.  Significantly these MEPs’ decision to leave the Assembly did not necessarily mark the end of their 
professional political careers.  The two Birmingham MEPs Christine Crawley and John Tomlinson went on to take 
seats in the House of Lords on the government benches.  Former group leader Wayne David announced his 
decision to retire from the Assembly having been selected for an ostensibly safe Welsh Assembly constituency.  
Unfortunately for him he lost the seat to Plaid Cymru in one of the most dramatic results of that particular election. 
 
ii It should also be noted that four MEPs who had originally been placed on a list withdrew between the 
announcement of the rankings and polling day.  David Morris (Wales) and Alex Smith (Scotland), both signatories 
to the Falconer statement, did so in protest at their poor rankings.  The other two cases were less straightforward.  
Previously a Cheshire MEP, the decision to transfer Blair supporter Lyndon Harrison to a winnable position on the 
Welsh list above popular sitting Member Joe Wilson caused controversy.  Following an outcry within a party 
already convulsed by a bruising contest for the Welsh leadership, Harrison resigned and was later named as a new 
peer in June 1999 (The Guardian 19th June 1999).  Media speculation suggested the two events were not 
unconnected in that Harrison's departure came at a useful point for moderniser backed candidate Alun Michael in 
his battle to secure the Welsh leadership.  Another casuality of the system was Christine Oddy, a Falconer 
supporter who then recanted and backed the David text.  A West Midlands MEP, she unsuccessfully appealed to 
the party and then threatened legal action following her relegation to an unwinnable list position.  In protest at the 
decision, Oddy resigned the whip and announced her intention to stand as an independent and went onto to receive 
a reasonable vote in the election.  Talking of her decision to leave the party, Oddy commented: 
'I want to give voters a choice of candidate, open up the totally  undemocratic nature of the closed-
list system and offer the possibility of voting for a local candidate rather than two London luvvies, to 
mark a protest against a system which shifts power from the voters to political party elites.' (Tribune ??th 
??). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
The list system was also criticised by a number of those, notably Lynne Armstrong and Joyce Edmond-Smith (both 
unsuccessful candidates in 1994), who had originally been selected (in their case for the South East region) but had 
resigned and then publicly protested about the workings of the rankings system.  Writing in The Guardian (8th 
October 1998) about her preference for the OMOV process, Edmond-Smith argued that the effective exclusion of 
the membership from the candidate selection procedure would in effect de-energise grassroots campaigners.  
Commentator Polly Toynbee was similarly critical of the process.  When the original lists were published, then 
journalist expressed dismay that the industrious East London MEP Carole Tongue had been relegated to a position 
on the capital’s list which made her re-election far from certain (in the event Tongue did lose out).  Toynbee 
suggested the MEP had been sacrificed by Millbank because of her advocacy of positions on media ownership 
which brought her into potential conflict with New Labour convert Rupert Murdoch, owner of the powerful News 
Corporation multi-national (The Guardian, 7th October 1998). 
 
Unlike Lyndon Harrison other Labour MEPs did successfully move regions:  Glyn Ford moved from the North 
West to take the top slot in South West; Arlene McCarthy switched from the East Midlands to take the number 1 
place in the North West; Anita Pollack switched from London to the a good ranking (3) in South East but lost out 
to the party’s poor overall showing.  All had endorsed the David text in support of Blair on the Clause Four debate.  
The only other MEP switching was by-election entrant Richard Corbett (North West to Yorkshire). 
 
iii  Of the 29 MEPs returned in 1999 22 had been elected in 1994.  Another two (Richard Corbett and Linda 
McAvan) had entered the Assembly through by-elections held during the parliamentary term.  Of the 5 brand new 
candidates, two are known supporters of Tony Blair: Michael Cashman (West Midlands), the former EastEnders 
actor, was elected to the Labour NEC in 1998 as part of the pro-leadership Members’ First slate; Catherine Taylor 
(Scotland) is a former NEC Youth Representative and was an advocate of the ‘new’ Clause Four position.  
Originally fourth on the list 25 year old Taylor made a crucial move up the Scottish list (Labour won 3 seats) when 
the candidate ranked third, GMB union official Kathleen Walker Shaw, resigned.  Walker Shaw, as the highest 
placed non-MEP on the list, had been obliged to fight a late 1998 by-election in the Scotland North East Euro 
constituency following the death of incumbent SNP member Allan MacCartney.  Unfortunately for her, political 
opponents used the campaign to attack then government.  Walker Shaw’s perceived Englishness and Brussels 
based job were highlighted in a bid to show how remote New Labour was from the Scottish people.  Unfortunately 
for the candidate a row over her nationality developed when it emerged she had been born in England not Scotland 
as was previously suggested.  In a bizarre twist Walker Shaw was alleged to have explained the mix-up thus:  ‘It is 
all a misunderstanding, I was born in Stafford, but I was conceived in Aberdeen’ (quoted by Lord MacKay of 
Ardbrecknish, House of Lords debates, 15th December; column 1314).  The party’s subsequent humiliation in the 
by-election, coming in third behind the Conservatives in a seat Labour held up to 1994, was used by some to 
question what they claimed to be the authoritarian, undemocratic and ultimately self-defeating selection system 
(see, for instance, comments by former Scotland North East MEP Henry McCubbin, Tribune, 8th January 1999). 
 
